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 Abstract 
 
This study uses Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) as a plausibly exogenous shock to the information 
environment to identify the causal effect of information asymmetry on corporate financing behavior. 
Although Regulation FD prevents firms from selectively disclosing material information to market 
professionals in the equity market, firms can still do so to banks and rating agencies in the debt 
market. The standard’s differential disclosure requirements lead to differential changes in the 
information environments between the two markets, providing a reasonably useful setting to 
examine the effect of information asymmetry on firms’ capital structure. I find that firms with a high 
level of information asymmetry increase debt more than firms with a low level of information 
asymmetry post-Regulation FD. The results suggest that managers adjust the target leverage ratios to 
rely more on debt when facing higher costs of equity. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior research shows that information asymmetry in the equity market is an important 
determinant of capital structure decisions (e.g., Bharath, Pasquariello, & Wu, 2009; Agarwal & 
O'Hara, 2007). Due to the higher equity cost of capital, firms with higher information asymmetry in 
the equity market are more likely to use debt financing. While previous studies have established a 
link between equity market information risk and capital structure, this link is less clear, because 
information risk can also affect the cost of debt.1 Moreover, previous studies usually relate the level 
of information asymmetry to capital structure, and a level-based approach is subject to an omitted 
variable problem. This study addresses these limitations of the literature by using Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (FD) as a plausibly exogenous shock to the equity market information environment to 
identify the causal effect of information asymmetry on firms’ capital structure.  
Regulation FD provides a potentially useful setting to examine whether information 
asymmetry affects firms’ financing decisions because the standard imposes differential disclosure 
requirements between the equity market and the debt market. In the equity market, the regulation 
prohibits any selective disclosure of material information by firms to favored market professionals.2 
In the debt market, in contrast, it exempts credit rating agencies and does not apply to banks.3 
Because Regulation FD primarily affects the equity market and has little impact on the debt market, 
                                                             
1 In this paper, I use information asymmetry and information risk interchangeably. The information risk is the risk faced 
by less informed investors when trading against better informed investors (see the discussion below and in Section 2). 
2 Rule 100(b)(1) of Regulation FD enumerates four categories of persons to whom selective disclosure may not be made 
absent a specified exclusion. The first three are securities market professionals: (1) broker-dealers and their associated 
persons; (2) investment advisers, certain institutional investment managers and their associated persons; and (3) 
investment companies, hedge funds, and affiliated persons. The fourth category of persons is any holder of the issuer's 
securities, under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such holder would purchase or sell securities on 
the basis of the information. 
3 Rule 100(b)(2) of Regulation FD exempts an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit ratings, provided 
that the information is collected solely for the purpose of developing a credit rating, and the entity's ratings are publicly 
available. It also sets out exclusions for communications made to a person who owes the issuer a duty of trust or 
confidence (e.g., attorney, investment banker, and accountant) and to any person who expressly agrees to maintain the 
information in confidence. Therefore, banks are excluded from Regulation FD, as long as they agree to hold private 
information in confidence. For details on the final rule, see http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm. 
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it is reasonable to assume that the information risk does not change in the debt market surrounding 
Regulation FD. Therefore, the change in firms’ capital structure is clearly associated with the change 
in information risk in the equity market.  
I hypothesize that Regulation FD changes corporate disclosure channels and that such 
change in turn affects firms’ financing decisions. The hypothesis is built on the literatures on 
corporate disclosure and financing choices. In the disclosure literature, prior studies find an inverse 
relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry among investors (Brown et al., 
2004; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). Information asymmetry among investors is further linked with 
cost of capital (Easley & O'Hara, 2004; Easley, Hvidkjaer, & O'Hara, 2002). Therefore, through 
asymmetric information among investors, corporate disclosure can affect a firm's financing costs. 
Regulation FD narrows firms' disclosure channels in the equity market by eliminating the 
selective disclosure channel. Its impact on the information environment is unlikely to be uniform 
across firms. Gomes et al. (2007) show that while large firms are able to compensate the loss of 
selective disclosure by attracting more analyst following and making more earnings pre-
announcements, small firms are unable to do so and they now face a higher cost of equity capital. 
Chen et al. (2009) find a reduction in the implied cost of equity capital post-Regulation FD only for 
large and medium firms. Wang (2007) finds that firms replacing private earnings guidance with 
nondisclosure after Regulation FD suffer deterioration in their information environments whereas 
firms replacing private guidance with public guidance enjoy an improvement. Overall these findings 
in prior studies suggest that after the implementation of Regulation FD, firms may increase, 
maintain, or decrease the level of information flow to the equity market. Since the regulation has 
little impact on the debt market, firms with improved information environments in the equity 
market may find equity financing relatively cheaper than debt financing and rely more on the equity 
market to raise capital. In contrast, firms with worsened information environments in the equity 
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market may have incentives to turn to the debt market, where private disclosure is still available. My 
results support this prediction.  
In this study, I focus on the information asymmetry among investors and not on the 
information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors. The information asymmetry 
between the firm and its investors is intrinsic to the firm and arises because firm managers have 
better information than outside investors. Prior studies typically use market reactions to the 
announcements of important company events to proxy for intrinsic information asymmetry (e.g., 
Dierkens, 1991; Agarwal and O’Hara, 2007). Larger market reactions suggest more unanticipated 
information in the announcement and therefore, larger information gaps between the firm and its 
investors. In contrast, the information asymmetry between market participants represents 
heterogeneity of investors' information sets and can be viewed as extrinsic to the firm.4 Proxies for 
extrinsic information asymmetry usually rely on patterns in security transaction data (e.g., order 
imbalances, bid-ask spreads). Since, by providing equal access to firm disclosures, the goal of 
Regulation FD is to reduce information asymmetry across different classes of investors, the 
regulation's direct and intended effects should be on extrinsic information asymmetry among 
investors.  
I use several proxies for extrinsic information asymmetry among investors. In the main 
analysis, I measure extrinsic information asymmetry using the adjusted probability of information-
based trading (AdjPIN) developed by Duarte & Young (2009), which is ultimately based on the 
market microstructure model by Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, & Paperman (1996). This measure gauges 
the extent of information asymmetry from the estimation of the arrival of information-based trades. 
In a set of supplemental analyses, I further use two alternative constructs to proxy for equity market 
information risk. The first construct follows models in Glosten & Harris (1988) and Hasbrouck 
                                                             
4 The definitions of extrinsic information asymmetry and intrinsic information asymmetry follow Agarwal & O'Hara 
(2007). 
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(1991). It extracts the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread from the serial covariance 
properties of the observed asset returns. The second construct is based on Llorente, Michaely, Saar, 
& Wang (2002), which measures the amount of private information trading based on the interaction 
between trading volume and asset returns. All of these proxies have been widely applied in the 
finance and accounting literatures.5 
I find that relative to firms facing a low level of information asymmetry, firms facing a high 
level of information asymmetry tend to be smaller firms that have weak earnings performance and 
fewer incentives to disclose publicly prior to the adoption of Regulation FD. I also find that these 
firms tend to experience larger increases in both analyst forecast errors and analyst forecast 
dispersion, and they attract fewer analysts post-Regulation FD. The findings suggest that firms with 
high information risk may not be able to replace private disclosure perfectly with public disclosure, 
and they experience deterioration in their equity market information environment after Regulation 
FD.  
To examine the link between capital structure and information risk, I employ two research 
designs. In the main analysis, I use a difference-in-differences method to control for time specific 
effects. This design is commonly used in the studies of regulatory changes (e.g., Low, 2009; 
Altamuro & Beatty, 2010). Since I am interested in the cross-sectional change in capital structure due 
to information asymmetry, I am essentially using a difference-in-difference-in-differences model, 
where the third differencing variable is the level of information asymmetry. In the supplementary 
analysis, I also use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model under which Regulation FD acts as an 
instrumental variable.6 This model has the benefit of showing that Regulation FD gives a strong 
enough shock to the information environment to make changes in capital structure plausible.  
                                                             
5 See, for example, Verrecchia & Weber (2006), Ferreira & Laux (2007), Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, & Willis (2008), Bharath, 
Pasquariello, & Wu (2009), Akins, Ng, & Verdi (2012), Shroff et al. (2013), etc. 
6 I thank the reviewer for suggesting this approach.  
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To employ the difference-in-difference-in-differences model, I need a control group 
composed of firms not affected by the standard. I identify two control groups. The first is 
constructed based on the methodology in Wang (2007). Wang's (2007) methodology allows me to 
use publicly available data to identify a group of firms that rely mainly on public disclosures to 
release earnings related news in the pre-Regulation FD period. Since Regulation FD prohibits 
releasing any material information to a privileged few, the rule is least likely to affect these public 
disclosers, who use limited private guidance. The second control group consists of firms holding 
open conference calls prior to the adoption of Regulation FD. Under the assumption that open call 
firms tend to have open disclosure policies, I expect Regulation FD to have a limited impact on 
these firms.  
My main finding is that under the difference-in-difference-in-differences model, firms with 
low information asymmetry do not change their leverage relative to the control group. In contrast, 
firms with high information asymmetry increase leverage relative to the control group. These 
findings hold whether leverage is measured by book leverage or market leverage, and whether 
extrinsic information asymmetry is measured by AdjPIN, the adverse selection component of the 
spread, or the amount of private information trading. Moreover, the results cannot be explained 
away by changes in the cost of debt. To mitigate the concern of confounding events surrounding the 
implementation of Regulation FD (e.g., the Internet bubble, the economic recession, the disclosure 
of accounting scandals, etc), I rerun the analysis using 1998, 1999, and 2001 as hypothetical 
implementation years of Regulation FD and find weaker or no results. The fact that year 2000 gives 
the strongest results suggests that Regulation FD is a strong driving force behind the findings. 
Consistent with the main findings, I also find information asymmetry positively associated with 
leverage using the 2SLS approach. Given that cost of capital is increasing in the level of extrinsic 
information asymmetry and Regulation FD has limited impact on the cost of debt, my findings are 
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consistent with the view that managers make a trade-off to increase the use of debt when facing 
increased costs of equity. The paper thus provides empirical evidence of the effect of information 
risk on corporate financing choices. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypothesis. I discuss the research 
design in Section 3. Section 4 conducts capital structure analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Effective October 23, 2000, the SEC passed Regulation FD that prohibits the disclosure of 
material nonpublic information to selective recipients unless the same information is released 
simultaneously to the general public. The goal of the regulation is to create a level playing field for all 
investors in accessing material corporate information. In the final rule, the Commission further 
states that Regulation FD will enhance investor confidence in the integrity of the capital markets by 
reducing "the potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to 
be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors" (SEC 2000). In this paper, I 
use Regulation FD as a plausibly exogenous shock to firms' information environments to investigate 
whether information risk affects corporate financing decisions.  
The adoption of Regulation FD is a potentially useful setting for testing the relation between 
information risk and capital structure, because the rule virtually has no impact on the debt market 
information environment. In the private debt market, firms with high costs of public disclosure can 
still privately convey information to banks. In the public debt market, rating agencies still have 
access to selective information.7 Because of Regulation FD's differential impact on the equity and 
                                                             
7 The fact that Regulation FD applies to bond analysts should have small influences on firms' capital structures. First, the 
public bond market is relatively small compared to the bank loan market. In 2005, the total US corporate bond issuance 
was $753 billion, while the total outstanding syndicated loan was $1.6 trillion (sources: Federal Reserve Board and 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association). Moreover, credit rating agencies, one of the major information 
intermediaries in the bond market, are excluded from Regulation FD (Rule 100(b)(2) of Regulation FD). Finally, I use 
information asymmetry among investors to link the information environment to cost of capital, and the degree of 
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debt markets, firms now face more constraints in disclosing information in the equity market than in 
the debt market.  
The impact of Regulation FD on firms’ equity market information environments is not 
uniform across firms. Gomes et al. (2007) find that while large firms are able to replace the loss of 
information flow from selective disclosure by attracting more analyst following and making more 
earnings pre-announcements, small firms are not able to do so. As a result, small firms face a 
deteriorated information environment and a higher cost of equity capital post-Regulation FD. 
Focusing on disclosure practices, Wang (2007) finds that roughly half of the firms that rely on 
private earnings guidance replace private guidance with nondisclosure instead of public guidance, 
and these firms suffer deterioration in their equity market information environments. She also finds 
that firms who replace private guidance with public guidance enjoy an improvement in their equity 
market information environments. Since Regulation FD affects firms with different characteristics 
differently, I expect cross-sectional variation in changes in extrinsic information asymmetry in the 
equity market. That is, some firms may experience a decrease in extrinsic information asymmetry 
whereas others may experience an increase.  
Extrinsic information asymmetry among security investors is positively related to the cost of 
capital. Easley and O'Hara (2004) demonstrate theoretically that securities with greater private 
information relative to public information have higher required returns (i.e., higher costs of capital). 
The higher return reflects the fact that private information increases the risk to uninformed 
investors of holding the security, because informed investors are better able to adjust their portfolio 
weights to incorporate the new information. In equilibrium, uninformed investors require 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
information asymmetry among bond investors should be small. Unlike the equity market, the bond market is essentially 
an institutional market. There are smaller differences in bond investors' technical expertise to acquire and process 
information. 
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compensation for bearing such risk. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) provide empirical support 
that information risk is priced. 
I predict that information risk is positively related to changes in debt financing after the 
implementation of Regulation FD. Firms with low information risk tend to be those that do not rely 
much on selective disclosure prior to the new regulation and are likely to increase or maintain the 
same level of disclosure as before. In contrast, firms with high information risk tend to be those that 
favor selective disclosure over public disclosure. If these firms’ optimal disclosure strategy does not 
allow them to replace selective disclosure fully with public disclosure, their equity market 
information environments are likely to deteriorate when selective disclosure is no longer available 
post-Regulation FD. The poorer information environment leads to a higher cost of equity capital. 
Consequently, these firms have incentives to turn to the debt market, where they face fewer 
constraints in privately communicating with capital providers and can, therefore, obtain relatively 
lower costs of capital. 
However, if the information disclosed in the debt market can perfectly spill over to the 
equity market, the debt market will have no informational advantage over the equity market after 
Regulation FD. In addition, if lenders in the debt market realize that certain types of firms need to 
rely more on them to raise capital and increase the borrowing costs, the debt market will have no 
cost advantage over the equity market. The null hypothesis (of no economic consequences) predicts 
that firms' capital structure remains unaffected by the standard. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Measuring extrinsic information asymmetry 
I measure extrinsic information asymmetry using the adjusted probability of information-
based trading (AdjPIN) developed by Duarte and Young (2009), which is in turn based on the 
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market microstructure model by Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996). The probability of 
information-based trading is commonly known as PIN. Duarte and Young (2009) decompose PIN 
into an information asymmetry component (adjusted PIN) and a non-information asymmetry 
component. Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young (2008) find that PIN is one of the most important 
determinants of changes in the cost of equity related to Regulation FD. Several other papers have 
also used PIN (or AdjPIN) to study a broad range of topics in accounting and finance.8 
In addition to PIN, measures of extrinsic information asymmetry are also often based on 
bid-ask spreads. The spread is comprised of three types of costs facing market makers: order 
processing costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse selection costs. The adverse selection costs 
compensate market makers for the risk of trading with the better informed, and hence, reflect the 
degree of information asymmetry among investors. 
Spread-based measures are not as suitable for this study as PIN. This is because the tick size 
changes several times around the implementation of Regulation FD, making it empirically 
challenging to estimate the regulation’s impact on the spread and its components. In 1997, both the 
NASDAQ and the NYSE reduced the minimum price increment from one-eighth dollar to one-
sixteenth dollar. In addition, in January 2001, just three months after the introduction of Regulation 
FD, the NYSE abandoned its tradition of trading in fractions and switched to decimals. The 
NASDAQ followed and decimalized shortly thereafter on April 9, 2001. The lower tick size has 
resulted in smaller quoted and effective bid-ask spreads (Bessembinder, 1999, 2003). It also affects 
the adverse selection component of the spread (Chakravarty, Van Ness, & Van Ness, 2005). Unlike 
spreads, the PIN model is based on order imbalances, which are less likely to be affected by the 
                                                             
8 For example, Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004) and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) use PIN to study the impact of firms' 
disclosure policies on the information environment. Vega (2006) uses PIN to study the effect of private and public 
information on the post-announcement drift. Ferreira and Laux (2007) use PIN to study the association between 
corporate governance and information flow. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) use PIN to show that private 
information has a positive impact on the sensitivity of real investment to stock price. Akins, Ng, and Verdi (2012) use 
AdjPIN to study the relation between investor competition and the pricing of information asymmetry. 
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changes in tick size.9 Although I view PIN as a more appropriate measure for the purpose of this 
study, spread-based measures are popular and well accepted in the literature. Therefore, in section 
4.3, I conduct supplemental analyses using the adverse selection component of the spread as an 
alternative proxy for extrinsic information asymmetry. 
3.2 Difference-in-difference-in-differences method 
I use the difference-in-difference-in-differences research design to discern the unique effect 
of Regulation FD on capital structure. A difference-in-differences design is commonly used in the 
studies of regulatory changes (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Low, 2009). Since I am interested 
in the cross-sectional changes in capital structure due to information asymmetry, I include the level 
of information asymmetry as the third differencing variable.  
To employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences design, I must identify a control group 
of firms that are not affected by the regulation and use their capital structure as the comparison base. 
A natural control group is American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and non-U.S. companies with 
securities listed on the U.S. exchanges, because both of them are exempted from Regulation FD. 
However, ADRs and foreign issuers are not suitable control firms for this study. Foreign firms have 
more financing choices than U.S. firms; therefore, the changes in their capital structure are not 
comparable to the changes for the U.S. firms. For example, when facing higher costs of capital in 
the U.S. equity market, U.S. firms must rely more on the debt market to raise capital and show an 
increase in leverage. In contrast, foreign firms can raise capital not only in the U.S. debt market, but 
also in their own home countries' equity and debt markets. Thus, their capital structure may remain 
                                                             
9 Smaller tick size lowers trading costs. It is possible that private information that was too costly to trade on now 
becomes more tradable, and, thus, there are more informed traders after the tick size change. However, lower trading 
costs will also lead to more trading by the uninformed. As long as the increase in the informed orders is similar to the 
increase in the uninformed orders, order imbalances and, thus, PIN should not be affected by the tick size change. 
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unchanged. 10  The wider financing choices render foreign companies an invalid control sample. 
Anecdotal evidence also shows that foreign issuers may be following the practice of U.S. firms and 
voluntarily complying with the regulation.11 This raises the question whether foreign securities are 
indeed unaffected by Regulation FD. 
I attempt to circumvent the lack of a natural control group by following a novel 
methodology developed by Wang (2007), which in turn is based on Matsumoto (2002). The 
methodology in Wang (2007) allows me to use public data to construct a sample of firms that use 
mainly public disclosures to convey information before the adoption of Regulation FD. These firms 
have an open disclosure policy and do not rely on private guidance. Therefore, I do not expect 
Regulation FD to have a significant impact on them. 
Using Wang's (2007) methodology to construct the control sample is advantageous, because 
the approach uses only public information and, thus, can apply to all firms with available data. 
However, the method is also subject to the limitation that it may misclassify firms and introduce 
noise to the analysis. To address the concern, in a set of supplementary tests, I use firms that held 
open conference calls before the implementation of Regulation FD as an alternative control group. 
Firms with an open call policy are less likely to be affected by Regulation FD, because presumably 
such firms do not rely much on selective communication. However, since conference calls are only 
one mechanism of disclosure, I cannot rule out the possibility that the treated group contains firms 
that have an open disclosure policy but use means other than conference calls to communicate with 
                                                             
10 It is also possible that U.S firms may cross list in foreign exchanges, thereby mitigating the effect of Regulation FD on 
their capital structure. However, prior research shows that the number of U.S. firms cross listed in foreign countries is 
relatively small. For example, Sarkissian & Schill (2010) document that only 60 U.S. firms have a foreign listing in the 
pre-Regulation FD period of 1996-2000, and this number reduced to 52 in the post-Regulation FD period of 2001-2006. 
Moreover, any cross-listing of U.S. firms will bias against me finding results on changes in their capital structure.  
11 For example, Citigroup's 2005 Depository Receipts Information Guide states that "many non-U.S. companies with 
securities trading in the U.S. (including DR issuers) have voluntarily opted to comply with the requirements of 
Regulation FD." 
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investors. Moreover, the conference call data are available only from March 1999 on.12 Therefore, I 
must infer firms' disclosure policies throughout the entire pre-Regulation FD period (1996-1999) 
based on less than a year of data. Because of these drawbacks, I rely on Wang's (2007) method to 
construct the control group in the main analysis and employ open call firms in the supplementary 
analysis. 
I estimate a model of the following form to test whether extrinsic information asymmetry in 
the equity market explains cross-sectional variation in changes in capital structure: 
Leverageit = αt + βi + cTreati*FDt + δTreati*FDt*InfoAsymi + φInfoAsymi*FDt + γControlsit + εit 
          (1) 
 
where Leverage is either book leverage or market leverage. I define book leverage as debt to book 
value of assets and market leverage as debt to market value of assets.13 αt is year fixed effects and βi 
is firm fixed effects. Treat and FD are dummy variables. Treat equals 1 if the firm is not classified as 
a public discloser by Wang's (2007) methodology and 0 otherwise. FD equals 1 if the observation is 
from the post-Regulation FD period and 0 otherwise. I correct standard errors to allow for 
clustering of errors at the firm level. InfoAsym is the firm’s average AdjPIN in the pre-Regulation 
FD period.14 Because the model includes both firm and year fixed effects, it is not necessary to 
include the main effects of Treat and FD and the interaction term of Treat*InfoAsym. These 
variables are either time invariant (Treat and Treat*InfoAsym), which will be absorbed by the firm 
fixed effects, or year specific (FD), which will be absorbed by the year fixed effects.  
                                                             
12 The conference call data are from Bushee, Matsumoto, & Miller (2004), who use data providers Bestcalls.com and 
Thomson First Call to identify open versus closed conference calls. Bestcalls.com provides data starting from March 
1999. 
13 I define book leverage and market leverage following Fama and French (2002). Market value of assets is defined as 
book value of assets (Compustat Item 6) minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. Book value of equity is 
defined as total assets less total liabilities (Item 181) and preferred stock (Item 10) plus deferred taxes (Item 35). When 
preferred stock is missing, it is replaced with the redemption value of preferred stock if available; if not, then it is 
replaced with the carrying value. Market value of equity is defined as common shares outstanding (Item 25) times price 
(Item 199). 
14 I use the pre-Regulation FD information asymmetry to measure each firm’s information risk, because presumably this 
information asymmetry is pre-determined relative to the new regulation. I thank the reviewer for making this suggestion.  
 13 
In equation (1) the coefficient c captures the differential changes in leverage between the 
treated and the control firms (conditional on InfoAsym being zero), and the coefficient φ captures 
the differential changes in leverage among firms with different levels of information asymmetry. The 
variable of interest is the triple interaction term Treat∗FD∗InfoAsym, where the coefficient δ 
captures the differential changes in leverage (relative to the control firms) between the treated firms 
with high and low levels of information asymmetry. The hypothesis predicts that the cross-sectional 
variation in information risk is positively related to changes in firms’ reliance on debt financing; 
hence, δ>0. 
Following the literature (e.g., Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian, Opler, & Titman, 2001; 
Fama & French, 2002; Agarwal and O'Hara, 2007), I include a set of firm characteristics as controls. 
They are intrinsic information asymmetry between the firm and its investors, growth opportunities, 
dividend payout, non-debt tax shields, asset tangibility, profitability, and firm size. Previous studies 
have found that firms with higher leverage tend to be larger firms and have higher intrinsic 
information asymmetry, lower growth opportunities, lower dividend payouts, lower non-debt tax 
shields, more tangible assets, and lower profitability. 
Intrinsic information asymmetry can confound the interpretation of the results if it is 
correlated with extrinsic information asymmetry. Following Dierkens (1991) and Agarwal and 
O’Hara (2007), I use abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements, AbRet, as the 
proxy for intrinsic information asymmetry. Higher abnormal returns indicate more unanticipated 
information in the earnings announcements and thus larger information gaps between firm 
managers and outside investors. AbRet is the average of the absolute cumulative abnormal returns 
(ACAR) of the quarterly earnings announcements for the year. I compute absolute cumulative 
abnormal return around earnings announcement day 0 as ACAR=|Π𝑡=−1
+1 (1+ARt)-1|, where AR is 
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abnormal return computed based on market model residuals estimated over the pre-announcement 
window (-200, -11). 
I measure growth opportunities using the market-to-book ratio, MTB, and research and 
development expenditure, R&D. MTB is the market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets. R&D is research and development expense (Item 46) divided by total assets. For firms with 
missing R&D expenses, I replace the missing R&D values with industry-year average.15 Dividend 
payout, Dividend, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if common stock dividends (Item 21) are positive 
and 0 otherwise. I use depreciation expenses to proxy for non-debt tax shields. Depreciation is 
depreciation and amortization expense (Item 14) divided by total assets. Asset tangibility, PPE, is 
defined as net plant, property, and equipment (Item 8) divided by total assets. Profitability, Profit, is 
defined as operating income before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13) divided by total assets. 
Size is the log of net sales (Item 12).16 
3.3 Sample selection 
Given that firms' capital structures are stable over time (Leary & Roberts, 2005; Lemmon, 
Roberts, & Zender, 2008), I need a sufficiently long sample period to detect any change in capital 
structures. I use an eight-year sample period from 1996 to 2004. I start the sample period in 1996 to 
closely follow Wang (2007), who uses 1996-1999 to classify firms' disclosure policies in the pre-
Regulation FD period.17 I end the sample period in 2004 so that the pre- and post-periods have an 
equal number of years. Moreover, former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox (in office from 2005-
                                                             
15 When firms do not separately report R&D expenses, the variable is missing in Compustat. Koh and Reeb (2014) find 
that firms who fail to provide information about their R&D expenditures in the financial statements on average have 
substantive amounts of R&D. Therefore, I set missing R&D to the industry-year mean, where industry is defined 
according to the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classifications. Setting the missing R&D to the industry average is 
also common in the management literature (see Koh and Reeb, 2014). The results are very similar if I assume the 
missing R&D as zero.  
16 All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers.  
17 Wang (2007) starts the sample period in 1996 for the following two reasons. First, effective in December 1995, the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act provides broader safe harbor provisions for voluntary disclosures. Second, 
starting in the mid-nineties, managers started to provide earnings guidance more pervasively. 
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2009) adopted policies that delayed the SEC’s investigations and discouraged corporate penalties. It 
is unclear to what extent Regulation FD was enforced while Cox was the Chairman.18 I specify 1996 
to 1999 as the period before Regulation FD and 2001 to 2004 as the period after Regulation FD, 
omitting the regulatory change year of 2000. 
To construct the control sample, I follow Wang's (2007) methodology and run the analysis 
in the pre-Regulation FD period using all Compustat firms with non-missing required variables. 
5,285 firms enter the analysis, of which 973 are classified as private disclosers, 993 are classified as 
public disclosers, 2,915 are classified as non-disclosers, and 404 firms are unclassified. The 993 pre-
Regulation FD public disclosers are the candidates for the control group.19 Appendix A provides the 
detailed estimation process and descriptive statistics. 
I further require that the 993 pre-Regulation FD public disclosers also exist in the post-
Regulation FD period and have the required data for the capital structure analysis. 273 firms pass 
this data screening and are the control firms in the main analysis.20 The initial treated sample consists 
of all of the U.S. firms with AdjPIN available from Duarte and Young (2009) and exist both pre- 
and post-Regulation FD with required data for the capital structure analysis. Excluding firms 
classified as the control group, 1,399 firms are left. In summary, the final sample consists of 1,672 
firms, of which 273 are the controlled and 1,399 are the treated. 
                                                             
18 See Government Accountability Office (GAO) March 2009 report “Securities and Exchange Commission, Greater 
Attention Needed to Enhance Communication and Utilization of Resources in the Division of Enforcement,” as well as 
GAO May 2009 “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.” For media articles, see, for example, 
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/13606254. 
19 Wang’s (2007) methodology relies on Thomson First Call's Company Issued Guideline database to classify firms into 
public, private, and non-disclosers. Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2007) and Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller (2013) find 
that First Call is more likely to cover firms with higher analyst following and its coverage became more complete after 
1998. The fact that First Call’s coverage may be incomplete prior to Regulation FD suggests some public disclosers may 
be misclassified as non-disclosers. This introduces noise to the analysis (as the treated may include public disclosers), 
which should bias against finding results.  
20 Requiring the firms to also exist in the post-Regulation FD period and to have non-missing Compustat and CRSP data 
for the capital structure analysis reduces the number of public disclosers to 584. Requiring non-missing AdjPIN data in 
the pre-Regulation FD period further reduces the number of public disclosers to 273.  
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Table 1 reports the industry distribution for the sample firms and for all available firm-years 
on Compustat during the sample period. The sample contains firms in every economic sector and 
does not show any particular industry clustering. 
4. Capital Structure Analyses 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Panel A shows the mean values of AdjPIN in the pre-Regulation FD period. I find 
that the pre-Regulation FD AdjPIN varies substantially in the cross section. Treated firms in the 
middle quintile have an average AdjPIN of 0.15, similar to the magnitude of the AdjPIN for the 
control firms. However, treated firms in the first quintile have an average AdjPIN of 0.101, and this 
number is almost tripled to 0.287 for firms in the fifth quintile. To explore why some firms have 
high levels of extrinsic information asymmetry, but others do not, I compare selected ex ante firm 
characteristics and changes in analyst behavior between treated firms in the top (Q5) and bottom 
(Q1) quintiles of AdjPIN. Table 2 Panel B reports the results.  
Firms with complex financial information and firms with high litigation costs are more likely 
to disclose publicly (Bushee, Matsumoto, & Miller, 2003; Skinner, 1994). Because these firms make 
less use of selective disclosure, they should have a lower level of extrinsic information asymmetry. 
Following Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2003), I use membership in high technology industries 
and revenue volatility as proxies for financial information complexity.21 I denote a firm to have high 
litigation costs if it is in a high litigation risk industry and also suffers an earnings decrease for at 
                                                             
21 Following Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2003), SIC codes classified as high-tech industries include: Drugs (2833-
2836); Electric Distribution Equipment (3612-3613); Electrical Industrial Apparatus (3621-3629); Household Audio & 
Video Equipment (3651-3652); Communications Equipment (3661-3669); Electron Tubes (3671); Printed Circuit 
Boards (3672); Semiconductors & Related Devices (3674); Magnetic and Optical Recording Media (3695); Telephone 
Communications (4812-4822); Radio & TV Broadcasting (4832-4899); and Computer and Data Processing Services 
(7370-7379). I measure revenue volatility as the standard deviation of quarterly revenue measured over three years, 
including and preceding the current year. 
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least 4 quarters during the pre-Regulation FD period.22 Consistent with the prediction, relative to 
firms in the fifth quintile, firms in the first quintile have higher litigation costs and more complex 
financial disclosures (when proxied by revenue volatility). 
Miller (2002) finds that firms increase public disclosure when they experience sustained 
strong earnings performance. Greater disclosure reduces information risk. Moreover, larger firms 
tend to have a more open disclosure policy and more analyst or media following; therefore, their 
information environments tend to be more transparent than smaller firms. Consistent with these 
expectations, firms in the first quintile are larger in size and have stronger firm performance, as 
measured by ROE or ROA, than firms in the fifth quintile.23 
I also explore whether analyst behavior changes differently for firms with different levels of 
information asymmetry. If after Regulation FD, the information environment for firms in the fifth 
quintile deteriorates to a larger extent than the information environment for firms in the first 
quintile, we would expect firms in the fifth quintile to have lower analyst following and worse 
analyst performance than firms in the first quintile. Consistent with the prediction, I find that, 
relative to firms in the first quintile, firms in the fifth quintile gain less analyst following and have 
larger increases in both forecast errors and forecast dispersion. 24, 25  
Table 2 Panel C reports descriptive information on variables used in the capital structure 
analysis. The sample firms on average finance 56% of the asset book value from borrowing, and the 
                                                             
22  Following Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), SIC codes classified as high litigation risk industries include: 
Biotechnology (2833-2836, 8731-8734); Computers (3570-3577, 7370-7374); Electronics (3600-3674); and Retailing 
(5200-5961). 
23 Untabulated analyses further show that Q1 firms are more likely to have credit ratings than Q5 firms. Credit rating 
agencies are exempt from Regulation FD. Jorion et al (2005) find that the information content of credit ratings increased 
after Regulation FD, possibly because credit analysts at rating agencies have access to confidential information that is no 
longer made available to equity analysts. Since credit ratings are publicly available, this suggests that Q1 firms are less 
likely to suffer a deterioration of information environment than Q5 firms.  
24 I define ‘forecast dispersion’ as the standard deviation of individual analysts' most recent earnings forecast in the 90 
days prior to the earnings announcement. I define ‘analyst following’ as the number of analysts making annual earnings 
per share forecast. I define ‘forecast error’ as the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings per share 
and the median of individual analysts' most recent earnings forecast in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. I 
scale the forecast error by the stock price at the fiscal quarter end. 
25 The difference in changes in forecast dispersion between Q1 and Q5 firms is only significant using a one-tailed test.  
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number drops to 44% when measuring the assets at market value. On average, the three-day 
absolute CAR at earnings announcements is 5% during the sample period. An average firm has a 
market-to-book ratio of 1.6; has 31% of its assets belonging to long-term assets; incurs R&D 
expenditures representing 9.5% of its assets and depreciation expenses representing 4% of its assets; 
makes profits representing 12% of its assets; and has annual sales of $3.8 billion. Dividend has a 
median value of 1, which suggests that the majority of firms pay out dividends during the sample 
period. 
4.2 Regression results on changes in capital structure 
Table 3 contains the central results of the capital structure analysis using book leverage and 
then market leverage. In both specifications, the coefficient on Treat∗FD∗InfoAsym is positive and 
significant (0.369, t-statistic of 1.908 for the book leverage specification; 0.330, t-statistic of 2.034 for 
the market leverage specification). This suggests that, relative to control firms, treated firms with 
high information asymmetry increase their leverage more post-Regulation FD than treated firms 
with low information asymmetry. I further find that firms with low information asymmetry do not 
change their leverage any differently from the control firms. In contrast, firms with high information 
asymmetry increase leverage relative to the control firms. 26  These results show a positive link 
between information risk and capital structure.  
I set all the control variables to their mean values and find that compared to firms with 
InfoAsym at the 25th percentile, firms with InfoAsym at the 75th percentile increase their book 
leverage by additional 2.67 percentage points relative to the control firms. Compared to the average 
                                                             
26 Specifically, I center InfoAsym at the 25th and 75th percentiles and rerun equation (1). After centering, the coefficient 
on Treat*FD measures the differential change in leverage between the treated firms and the control firms at the 25th and 
75th percentiles of InfoAsym. I find that when InfoAsym is centered at the 25th percentile, the coefficient on Treat*FD is 
insignificant for both book leverage and market leverage (t-statistics of 0.06 and 0.35). In contrast, when InfoAsym is 
centered at the 75th percentile, the coefficient on Treat*FD becomes significant for both book leverage and market 
leverage (t-statistics of 1.92 and 2.15).  
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change in book leverage of 1.57 percentage points for the treated firms, this increase is economically 
significant. The average book assets for the treated group are $8,785 million. Therefore, compared 
to firms with InfoAsym at the 25th percentile, firms with InfoAsym at the 75th percentile raise an 
additional $235 million of debt relative to the control firms. I also find that, consistent with the 
pecking order theory, increases in intrinsic information asymmetry between managers and investors 
tend to increase leverage, and increases in profitability tend to reduce leverage. 
A natural question emerging from the results is that, if firms can reduce information 
asymmetry and enjoy lower cost of capital by eliminating selective disclosure, why did they not 
voluntarily choose to do so prior to Regulation FD? Whether firms employ open disclosure policies 
depends on the relative benefits (e.g., lower costs of capital) and costs of being open. The potential 
costs of being open include losing the use of selective information to exchange favorable 
recommendations from analysts, facing higher proprietary costs and litigation risk, and increasing 
the risk of misinterpretation of complicated information by less skilled users.27 For firms with high 
information risk, managers may have perceived that these costs exceeded the benefits of an open 
communication policy and, therefore, decided to convey information privately. In this paper, I do 
not explore why firms choose one disclosure policy over the other. Rather, I focus on using the 
exogenous change in information environments that resulted from Regulation FD to investigate 
whether information risk affects firms' financing decisions. 
Overall, Table 3 provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that information risk 
affects corporate financing behavior. Using the plausibly exogenous changes in disclosure policy 
caused by Regulation FD, I find that firms with low extrinsic information asymmetry in the equity 
market do not show any change in leverage relative to the control firms; however, firms with high 
extrinsic information asymmetry become more highly levered than the control firms. Firms with low 
                                                             
27 See Laderman (1998) and Unger (2000, 2001) for discussions on why firms may prefer selective disclosures. 
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information asymmetry tend to be those that do not use much selective disclosure prior to 
Regulation FD and therefore, are less likely to be affected by the new regulation. In contrast, firms 
with high information asymmetry tend to be those that rely on selective disclosure to convey 
information in the equity market. These firms that seek to raise capital after Regulation FD are likely 
to turn to the debt market where selective disclosure is still available and, therefore, they can obtain 
a relatively lower cost of capital.28 
4.3 Alternative proxies for extrinsic information risk 
To validate my results further, in this section I rerun the analysis using three additional 
measures for extrinsic information asymmetry that are not based on the PIN model. The first 
measure is the private information trading measure suggested by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang 
(2002). The second and third measures are the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread 
estimated using two different empirical models of price formation. One is the methodology 
suggested in Glosten and Harris (1988) and adopted by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996). The 
other is the framework in Foster and Viswanathan (1993), which is ultimately based on Hasbrouck 
(1991). I estimate these measures for all common stocks in CRSP that have the required data for the 
capital structure analysis. I then compute the mean values of these measures for each firm in the pre-
Regulation FD period. Appendix B details the methodology of these three measures. 
Table 4 reports the results of changes in capital structure using the three alternative proxies 
for extrinsic information asymmetry. Columns [1] and [2] show that firms with high levels of private 
                                                             
28 A recent paper by Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2011) shows that the communication of information to investors 
affects both the average precision of investors and the information asymmetry. In perfectly competitive markets, the 
average precision, not the information asymmetry, affects cost of capital. Their results suggest that, if the U.S. equity 
market is in perfect competition, my findings are driven by changes in average precision, not changes in information risk. 
However, it is empirically challenging to separate these two effects, because Regulation FD affects the overall 
information flow and thus will affect both average precision and information asymmetry. Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 
(2011) also suggest that "empirically, average precision and information asymmetry may both change simultaneously, 
making it difficult to distinguish one from the other." 
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information trading tend to experience larger increases in leverage post-Regulation FD. The 
coefficient on the triple interaction term Treat*FD*InfoAsym is positive and significant for both 
book leverage (0.166, t-statistic of 1.775) and market leverage (0.186, t-statistic of 2.850). Turning to 
columns [3] and [4], I find that the adverse selection component estimated using the method of 
Glosten and Harris (1988) is positively associated with the change in market leverage, but is only 
weakly associated with the change in book leverage where the coefficient on Treat*FD*InfoAsym is 
only significant at the one-tailed 10% level. Similarly, columns [5] and [6] show that, when the 
adverse selection component is estimated using the method of Hasbrouck (1991), it is positively 
associated with the change in market leverage, but only weakly associated with the change in book 
leverage (p-value = 0.08, one-tailed).  
Overall, Table 4 supports the earlier finding that Regulation FD affects capital structure 
through its influences on the equity market disclosure environment. Firms with high levels of 
information asymmetry are unlikely to fully replace private disclosure with public disclosure, which 
in turn leads to deterioration in the information environment and a higher cost of equity. These 
firms are more likely to turn to the debt market to raise capital post-Regulation FD than firms with 
low levels of information asymmetry. Table 4 shows that this result is robust to alternative proxies 
for extrinsic information asymmetry. 
4.4 Open conference call firms as an alternative control group 
Since Wang's (2007) methodology may introduce errors in classifying control firms, in this 
section I rerun the analysis using open conference call firms as an alternative control group. I obtain 
the conference call data from Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2004). Bushee et al. (2004) use 
Bestcalls.com to identify firms hosting open conference calls. The start of the Bestcalls database is 
March 1999. To avoid possible anticipation effects, I classify a firm as an open caller if it held open 
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conference calls before 2000. 514 firms are classified as open call firms. I further require these firms 
to exist in the post-Regulation FD period and have all required data for estimating equation (1). 118 
firms pass the data screening. I reclassify the remaining 1,554 firms in the original sample as the 
treated firms. 
Table 5 presents the regression results with open callers as the control firms. For both the 
book leverage and the market leverage specifications, I find that the coefficient on 
Treat*FD*InfoAsym is positive, but with weaker statistical significance compared to the main 
results in Table 3. Specifically, the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level (two-tailed test) for 
the market leverage specification (0.426, t-statistic of 1.726). For the book leverage specification, the 
significance of the coefficient further drops to the one-tailed 10% level. Overall, the result in Table 5 
is still weakly consistent with the earlier finding that the equity market information risk is positively 
related to changes in leverage.  
4.5 Is the change in capital structure really caused by Regulation FD? 
The 1997 Asian and the 1998 Russian financial crises closed down debt financing, and the 
post-Regulation FD period coincides with the recovery of the debt market. One concern is that, if 
the recovery of the debt market is faster for firms with high information risk, then the results are not 
driven by Regulation FD but by the debt market recovery. Moreover, because the period 
surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD contains other events (e.g., the economic 
recession, the Internet bubble, the decimalization of the stock exchanges, and numerous accounting 
scandals), it is also possible that these confounding events are driving the results. To address these 
concerns, I rerun the tests using 1998, 1999, and 2001 as the hypothetical implementation years of 
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Regulation FD. If Regulation FD is the main driving force behind the findings, I should find weaker 
or no results using these hypothetical implementation years.29 
Untabulated analysis shows that rerunning the tests with hypothetical implementation years 
around Regulation FD leads to weaker or no results. For example, when I use 1998 as the 
implementation year (i.e., pre-Regulation FD period is from 1994-1997 and post-Regulation FD 
period is from 1999-2002), the coefficient on Treat*FD*InfoAsym becomes insignificant for both 
book leverage (0.243, t-statistic of 1.274) and market leverage (-0.035, t-statistic of -0.121). With 
1999 as the implementation year (i.e., pre-Regulation FD period is from 1995-1998 and post-
Regulation FD period is from 2000-2003), the coefficient on Treat*FD*InfoAsym is significant only 
for book leverage (0.317, t-statistic of 1.879) and is not significant for market leverage (0.035, t-
statistic of 0.182). Finally, when I use 2001 as the implementation year (i.e., pre-Regulation FD 
period is from 1997-2000 and post-Regulation FD period is from 2002-2004), the significance level 
for the coefficient on Treat*FD*InfoAsym decreases for both book leverage and market leverage. 
For book leverage, Treat*FD*InfoAsym is significant only at the one-tailed test (0.330, t-statistic of 
1.490). For market leverage, the significance level drops to the 10% level (0.346, t-statistic of 1.790). 
The fact that year 2000 gives the strongest result provides evidence that Regulation FD is an 
important driving force behind the findings. 
4.6 Changes in cost of debt 
One alternative explanation for the documented results is that firms with higher levels of 
information asymmetry in the equity market also experience greater decreases in the cost of debt. 
The lower cost of debt makes debt a cheaper capital source and thus increases leverage. To 
                                                             
29 When running the tests with hypothetical implementation years around Regulation FD, I re-estimate the control group 
based on Wang's (2007) methodology. For example, when 1998 is used as the implementation year, I employ the 
information from 1994-1997 (i.e., the hypothetical pre-Regulation FD period) to identify the control group. Similarly, 
when 1999 (2001) is used as the implementation year, I use the data from 1995-1998 (1997-2000) to classify the control 
group. 
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investigate this explanation, I examine the interest rates of the bonds issued and the bank loans 
raised during the sample period. I retrieve bond data from the Mergent database and bank loan data 
from Dealscan. I employ a regression model similar to equation (1) with cost of debt as the 
dependent variable: 
Spreadit = αt + βi + cTreati*FDt + δTreati*FDt*InfoAsymi + φInfoAsymi*FDt + γControlsit + εit 
          (2) 
 
For bank loans, Spread is the number of basis points above LIBOR charged on the loan. For bonds, 
Spread is the number of basis points above the yield of Treasury bond with similar maturity and 
coupon rate. After data requirements, 678 firms initiate debt both in the pre-Regulation FD and 
post-Regulation FD periods, among which 254 issue public bonds, 605 borrow bank loans, and 181 
have both bond and bank borrowings. 540 of the 678 firms are treated firms, and 138 are control 
firms.  
Following the literature (e.g., Beatty, Ramesh, & Weber, 2002; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Patel, 
1999), I include a set of control variables related to debt pricing. The variables that are common to 
both public and private debt pricing are: the credit rating (S&PRating), the leverage (MktLev) and 
size (Size) of the borrower, the maturity (Maturity) and size (DebtSize) of the debt, the credit spread 
(CreditSpread), the yield spread (YieldSpread), and whether the debt is secured (Security). The 
variables that are specific to public debt pricing are: whether the issuer can redeem the bond before 
maturity (Redeem) and the age of the issuer (Age). The variables that are specific to private debt 
pricing are: whether the loan is a revolving loan (Revolve) and whether the purpose of the loan is for 
a takeover (Takeover).30 
                                                             
30 I follow the procedure in Barth, Hodder, and Stubben (2008) to estimate the firm's S&P bond rating. S&PRating 
ranges from 1 for AAA to 22 for D; MktLev is market leverage (using book leverage yields similar results); Maturity is 
the number of years between the start and the end dates of the debt; DebtSize is the amount of the debt raised divided 
by the total assets of the borrower; CreditSpread is the difference between the Baa corporate bond and 30-year yield on 
the U.S. Treasury bonds; YieldSpread is the difference in the 10-year and 3-month yields on U.S. Treasury bonds; 
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Table 6 reports the results of equation (2). In column [1], I combine public and private debt 
and include control variables common to both types of debt. Since public debt and private debt may 
have different attributes, in columns [2] and [3], I estimate the model separately for each type of 
debt. The results offer no support for the cost of debt explanation. The coefficients on 
Treat*FD*InfoAsym are insignificant under all three specifications. Therefore, we cannot infer that 
changes in cost of debt around Regulation FD were different for firms with high levels of extrinsic 
information asymmetry in the equity market relative to firms with low levels of extrinsic information 
asymmetry. In contrast, the results support the assumption that Regulation FD has virtually no 
impact on the debt market information environment.  
4.7 Alternative research design – two-stage least squares 
 I use Regulation FD as an instrumental variable and employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
model as an alternative research design to further validate my results. Specifically, I estimate a first 
stage regression that identifies exogenous changes in information asymmetry due to the adoption of 
Regulation FD and then use the predicted values of information asymmetry to explain capital 
structure in the second stage regression. This research design is complementary to the difference-in-
difference-in-differences approach. However, by estimating the first stage regression, a 2SLS design 
has the benefit of showing that Regulation FD gives a strong enough shock to the information 
environment to make changes in capital structure plausible.  
 Table 7 reports the regression results. The result of the first-stage regression suggests that 
the regulatory impact on AdjPIN is economically significant (column [1]). The coefficient on the FD 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Security is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the debt is secured and 0 otherwise; Redeem is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the issuer can redeem the bond before maturity and 0 otherwise; Age is the number of days the firm appears 
on CRSP when the bond is issued; Revolve is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the loan is a revolving loan and 0 
otherwise; Takeover is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the purpose of the loan is for takeover and 0 otherwise. 
S&PRating, MktLev, and Size are measured at the fiscal year end preceding the debt contract. CreditSpread and 
YieldSpread are measured at the month when the debt is raised. 
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dummy variable indicates that a firm on average experiences a 0.9% reduction in AdjPIN after the 
adoption of Regulation FD. This result is consistent with findings in prior research that on average 
the information environment in the equity market improves after Regulation FD (e.g., Heflin et al., 
2003; Eleswarapu et al., 2004). Given the average AdjPIN of 0.165 in the pre-Regulation FD period, 
the reduction represents a 5% drop in AdjPIN. This drop is large in magnitude, because information 
risk is highly persistent over time. Easley et al. (2002) document that “…individual stocks exhibit 
relatively low variability in the probability of information-based trading across years.” Duarte and 
Young (2009) reach a similar conclusion with AdjPIN. I regress annual changes in AdjPIN on 
changes in the same set of control variables as in column [1] over the period of 1983–2004. I find 
that, on average, the absolute value of the annual change in AdjPIN is only about 0.2%, which 
suggests that Regulation FD’s impact on AdjPIN is 4 times larger than the average annual change.  
 Columns [2] and [3] show that the fitted AdjPIN is positively associated with both book 
leverage (1.173, t-statistic of 2.499) and market leverage (0.837, t-statistic of 1.816). The result is 
consistent with my prior findings that, due to the higher equity cost of capital, firms with higher 
extrinsic information asymmetry in the equity market are more likely to use debt financing.31 
In columns [4] – [6], I include additional control variables that may affect information risk. 
Institutions influence a firm's information environment and price informativeness (El-Gazzar, 1998; 
Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2002). I define institutional ownership, InstOwn, as the 
proportion of the firm's shares held by institutions. Prior research finds that extrinsic information 
asymmetry is lower for firms with larger analyst following (e.g., Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995; 
Easley, O'Hara, & Paperman, 1998). Coverage is the number of analysts making annual EPS 
forecasts in the year. Finally, Van Ness, Van Ness, & Warr (2001) investigate the relation between 
                                                             
31 I estimate the 2SLS model using the Stata package ivreg, which takes into account that Predicted AdjPIN in the 
second stage is estimated rather than observed and adjusts for the standard errors accordingly. I do not report the R2 in 
the second stage, because as Wooldridge (2000) points out the R2 for an instrumental variable estimation “is not very 
useful” and “has no natural interpretation.” Some of the R2 in the second stage are also negative.  
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adverse selection cost and several corporate governance variables. They find that volume and 
volatility are the only variables persistently associated with adverse selection components of the 
spread estimated under different model specifications. Volume is the average monthly share 
turnover, and Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return. 
Including additional control variables slightly attenuates the magnitude of the coefficient on 
FD in the first stage regression (column [4]). However, the variable is still negative and statistically 
significant (-0.006, t-statistic of -3.77). More importantly, in the second stage, the fitted values of 
AdjPIN remain positively correlated with both book leverage and market leverage.  
Overall, the results in Table 7 provide additional support for the original finding that 
Regulation FD changes the information environment through its influences on firms’ disclosure 
policies. I find that the change in information asymmetry is large in magnitude and that information 
asymmetry is positively related to firms’ reliance on debt financing. The result supports the 
hypothesis that information risk affects firms’ financing choices.   
4.8 Additional analysis and other robustness checks 
I conduct several additional analyses, the results of which I summarize here without 
reporting the full estimates. So far, I have documented that relative to the control sample, firms with 
high extrinsic information asymmetry increase their leverage more after Regulation FD than firms 
with low extrinsic information asymmetry. The increase in leverage may come from more debt 
issued, less equity issued, or lower retained earnings. To obtain a more complete picture of how the 
capital structure changes, I examine the components related to changes in leverage: net equity issues 
(EIssue), newly retained earnings (ΔRE), and net debt issues (DIssue). I regress each of these three 
components on Treat∗InfoAsym to determine the components through which leverage changes. 
The model takes the form: 
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Componenti = β1 + β2Treati + β3Treati*InfoAsymi + β4InfoAsymi + γΔControli + Δεi  (3) 
 
where Component is either EIssue, ΔRE, or DIssue. 
Following the balance sheet measures in Baker & Wurgler (2002), I define net equity issues 
(EIssue) as the change in mean BV of equity minus the change in mean retained earnings (Item 36) 
from pre-Regulation FD to post-Regulation FD, all divided by post-Regulation FD mean assets. 
ΔRE is the change in mean retained earnings from pre-Regulation FD to post-Regulation FD 
divided by post-Regulation FD mean assets. I define net debt issues (DIssue) as the residual change 
in mean assets from pre-Regulation FD to post-Regulation FD divided by post-Regulation FD mean 
assets.32 ΔControl is the change in the mean control variables from pre-Regulation FD to post-
Regulation FD. By differencing between the pre- and the post-Regulation FD periods, equation (3) 
removes firm fixed effects, and the year fixed effects are captured by the intercept.33 
I find that the effect of extrinsic information asymmetry on capital structure comes mainly 
through new debt issues. When the dependent variable is net debt issuance, the coefficient on 
Treat∗InfoAsym is positive and significant (0.76, t-statistic of 2.91). In contrast, when the dependent 
variable is either net equity issuance or newly retained earnings, the coefficient on Treat∗InfoAsym 
is not significant (t-statistics of -0.519 and -0.048, respectively). These results suggest that more debt 
issues contribute to the higher leverage for firms with higher extrinsic information asymmetry. The 
changes in capital structure are not driven by changes in retained earnings or new equity issues. 
Because Regulation FD has the least impact on banks, I expect the increase in the new debt 
issues for firms with high information asymmetry to come mainly from bank debt issues. I calculate 
                                                             
32 The balance sheet measures in Baker and Wurgler (2002) rely on the balance sheet identity that assets equal debt plus 
book equity (A = D + BE), and book equity equals retained earnings plus equity capital contribution (BE = RE + CC). 
Therefore, new equity issuance is the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings (EIssue = ΔBE - 
ΔRE) and new debt issuance is the residual change in assets (DIssue = ΔA – ΔBE = ΔA – EIssue – ΔRE). 
33  In this analysis four sample firms do not have non-missing data on retained earnings for both pre- and post-
Regulation FD periods, so I cannot calculate their EIssue and ΔRE. The number of observations for the regressions is 
1,672 when DIssue is the dependent variable and 1,668 when EIssue or ΔRE is the dependent variable. 
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the difference in the average amount of bonds and bank loans issued between the post-Regulation 
FD period and the pre-Regulation FD period deflated by the post-Regulation FD average assets for 
the treated firms in the fifth quintile of InfoAsym. Consistent with the expectation, I find that, on 
average, these firms increase their bond issues by 2.97% and their bank loans by 6.37%. However, 
the difference is only weakly significant (p-value = 0.058, one tailed). 
I conclude the paper by conducting additional robustness checks. First, I use idiosyncratic 
volatility (Ψ) as an alternative proxy for intrinsic information asymmetry between the firm and its 
shareholders. Higher idiosyncratic volatility indicates a larger amount of firm-specific information 
that is not shared by the market and thus higher information asymmetry between the firm and its 
shareholders (Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999; Krishnaswami, Spindt, & Subramaniam, 1999). 
I measure idiosyncratic volatility as Ψ=ln(1-R²/R²), where R² is estimated from a firm-year 
regression of daily returns on contemporary market returns and lagged market returns.34 All results 
hold when replacing AbRet with Ψ. Moreover, since the capital structure of firms in the financial 
sector (6000s SICs) and the utility sector (4900-4999 SICs) is likely to differ from other firms, I 
rerun the analysis after excluding these firms from the sample. I find qualitatively similar results. 
5. Conclusion 
Using plausibly exogenous changes in the information environment associated with 
Regulation FD, I examine the relation between information risk and capital structure. Using both a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences design and a 2SLS design, I find that extrinsic information 
asymmetry in the equity market is positively associated with changes in firms’ reliance on debt 
financing post-Regulation FD. This finding is robust to alternative proxies for extrinsic information 
                                                             
34 I include lagged market returns to avoid the problem of thin trading. For stocks with low liquidity, stock prices may 
not incorporate new information immediately, but with a lag. I also estimate Ψ by regressing daily returns on 
contemporary market returns and both lead and lag market returns. The results are very similar. 
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asymmetry, and cannot be explained by changes in the cost of debt or changes in the general macro 
conditions. Given that cost of capital is increasing in the level of extrinsic information asymmetry, 
my results are consistent with the view that managers adjust the target leverage ratios to rely more 
on debt when facing an increased cost of equity associated with the firm’s information environment. 
The paper thus provides empirical evidence of the effect of information risk on corporate financing 
choices. 
This paper contributes to the literature by using Regulation FD as a plausibly natural 
experiment to establish a link between information risk and capital structure. The differential 
impacts of the standard on the equity market and the debt market make the rule change a useful 
setting in which to test the hypothesis. While prior studies have established a link between equity 
market information risk and capital structure (e.g., Bharath et al., 2009; Agarwal and O'Hara, 2007), 
such a link is less clear, because information risk can also affect cost of debt. Since Regulation FD 
primarily affects the equity market information environment and has little impact on the debt market 
information environment, it is reasonable to assume that any changes in capital structure are 
associated with changes in the equity market information risk. Therefore, this paper establishes a 
cleaner link between information risk and capital structure. 
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Appendix 
A. Identification of Public, Private, and Non-disclosers 
Wang (2007) uses the following four equations from Matsumoto (2002) to estimate each 
firm's total earnings guidance: 
Δ𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡−1,𝑞
= 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑗𝑡 (
Δ𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞−1
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡−1,𝑞−1
) + 𝛽2𝑖𝑗𝑡𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡      (A.1) 
𝐸[Δ𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞] = [?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + ?̂?1𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 (
Δ𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞−1
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡−1,𝑞−1
) + ?̂?2𝑖𝑗𝑡−1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞] ∗ 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡−1,𝑞   (A.2)  
𝐸[𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞] = 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡−1,𝑞 + 𝐸[Δ𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞]       (A.3) 
𝑈𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞 = 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞 − 𝐸[𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑞]         (A.4) 
where i indexes the firm, j indexes the industry (four-digit SIC code), q indexes the quarter, and t 
indexes the year. ΔEPSijtq is seasonal change in earnings per share; P is price; CRET is daily excess 
returns cumulated from three days after last year same quarter's earnings announcement to 20 days 
before the current earnings announcement; F is analyst forecast; and UF is unexpected analyst 
forecast. 
Equation (A.1) models the seasonal change in EPS as a function of the prior quarter's 
seasonal change in EPS and cumulative daily returns. Equation (A.1) is estimated for each firm-year. 
The estimation uses all firm-quarters in that year from the same industry, excluding data from the 
firm under estimation. The coefficients from equation (A.1) are then used to calculate the expected 
change in EPS as in equation (A.2). Equation (A.3) defines the expected analyst forecast as last year 
same quarter EPS plus the expected seasonal change in EPS from equation (A.2). Finally the 
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unexpected analyst forecast in equation (A.4) is the actual forecast minus the expected forecast. 
Wang (2007) defines the absolute value of UF as total earnings guidance. 
Wang (2007) further uses the following equation to separate out private guidance from the 
total guidance: 
|𝑈𝐹𝑖𝑞| = 𝛾0𝑖 + 𝛾1StdΔ𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑞 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑞 + 𝛾3#𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑞 + 𝜇𝑖𝑞   (A.5) 
where StdΔEPS is standard deviation of seasonal changes in EPS during the prior three years; LOSS 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm reports a loss, 0 otherwise; and #PublicDisclosure is 
the number of earnings related public disclosures from First Call's Company Issued Guideline 
database. StdΔEPS and LOSS proxy for the predictability of earnings. Firms with harder to predict 
earnings are more likely to give guidance and thus, γ₁ and γ₂ are expected to be positive. Public 
disclosures proxy for the amount of public guidance and thus are expected to be positively 
associated with total guidance (i.e., γ₃>0). 
Wang (2007) defines quarterly private earnings guidance as the absolute value of the sum of 
the firm-specific intercept and the error term. Annual average private guidance is the mean of the 
quarterly private guidance in the year. Wang (2007) then classifies firms as private disclosers if their 
annual private guidance ranks in the top 40 percent in every year of the firms' available years in the 
pre-Regulation FD period. Firms are classified as public disclosers if their mean earnings related 
public disclosures is 30 percent more than the average of all private disclosers. Firms are classified as 
non-disclosers if their mean earnings related public disclosures is 30 percent less than the average of 
all private disclosers. 
I apply the above estimation procedure on all Compustat firms with non-missing variables in 
the pre-Regulation FD period. Table 8 Panel A reports the estimation results of equation (A.5). 
Consistent with Wang (2007), the coefficients on the explanatory variables are all positive and 
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significant. Firms with harder to predict earnings and with more public disclosures tend to provide 
more earnings guidance. Panel B reports descriptive information on earnings related public 
disclosures by firm type. There are 2,915 firms classified as non-disclosers, 973 as private disclosers, 
and 993 as public disclosers. On average, public disclosers issue 0.59 earnings related public 
disclosures per quarter and private disclosers issue 0.22 per quarter (i.e., about once per year). Non-
disclosers only issue 0.03 public disclosures per quarter. 
B. Estimation of Private Information Trading and the Adverse Selection Component of the 
Bid-Ask Spread 
I use three alternative proxies for extrinsic information asymmetry. The first is the amount 
of private information trading developed by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002). The 
measure is based on the argument that hedging trades generate negative autocorrelated returns and 
speculative trades generate positive autocorrelated returns. 35  The annual amount of private 
information trading can be estimated from the following firm-year regression: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐2𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1       (B.1) 
where R is daily stock return and V is the log of daily turnover detrended by subtracting a 200 
trading day moving average. Stocks with positive c₂ are associated with speculative trade (i.e., high 
amount of private information trading), while stocks with negative c₂ are associated with hedging 
trade (i.e., low amount of private information trading). 
The second measure is the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread introduced in 
Glosten and Harris (1988). Glosten and Harris (1988) test several different model specifications and 
show that the following one is the most useful and parsimonious one "that captures the essence of 
                                                             
35  Hedging trades are defined as trades initiated by investors to rebalance their portfolios for risk sharing, while 
speculative trades are initiated by investors to speculate on their private information. 
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the asymmetric information spread theory, and that yields reasonable, economically feasible 
estimates (p. 134)." Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) adopt this specification to analyze the 
relation between stock returns and illiquidity. 
Δ𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆𝑞𝑡 + 𝜓[𝐷𝑡 −𝐷𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝑡        (B.2) 
where p is transaction price; D is order sign that equals 1 for buy orders and -1 for sell orders; and q 
is signed order flow that equals D multiplying the number of shares traded. The variable portion of 
the price change, λ, is the adverse selection cost component. 
The third measure is also the adverse selection cost component, but is constructed based on 
the framework in Hasbrouck (1991). Hasbrouck (1991) models the adverse selection cost 
component as the amount by which the market maker adjusts the quote for unexpected order flow. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) follow Hasbrouck's (1991) approach, but rather than focusing on 
bid-ask quote, they focus on transaction price. I follow Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and estimate 
the following equations: 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝛼𝑞 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘Δ𝑝𝑡−𝑘
5
𝑘=1 +∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑞𝑡−𝑘
5
𝑘=1 + 𝜏𝑡  
Δ𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏𝑡 +𝜓[𝐷𝑡 −𝐷𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝑡       (B.3) 
The coefficient estimate λ in equation (B.3) is the adverse selection component of the price change. 
I estimate the above three information asymmetry proxies for all firms in CRSP that have 
the available data for the capital structure analysis. I require the estimated coefficients (i.e., 𝑐2̂ (B.1) 
and ?̂? in (B.2) and (B.3)) to be significant at least at 10% level. I scale ?̂? by multiplying by 10,000 for 
presentation purpose.  
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Table 1: Industry Distribution 
 
This table reports the industry distribution for the sample firms and for the whole Compustat population during the sample 
period.  
 
Industry Sample Firms (%) Compustat Population (%) 
01-09 Agriculture 0.3 0.4 
10-19 Mining & Construction 7.1 7.8 
20-27 Food, Paper & Finished Goods 11.0 6.3 
28-29 Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals 7.0 6.9 
30-34 Rubber, Leather, and Metal Works 8.0 4.1 
35-36 Machinery & Electronics 10.8 11.1 
37-39 Other Equipment & Machinery 8.0 7.5 
40-49 Transportation, Telecom & Utilities 11.3 9.9 
50-51 Wholesalers 3.8 3.5 
52-59 Retailers 7.6 5.4 
60-69 Banks 13.2 19.9 
70-79 Personal & Business Services 8.0 13.1 
80-99 Miscellaneous & Other Services 3.8 4.0 
Total 100 100 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics. Panel A reports the means of AdjPIN in the pre-Regulation FD period. Panel B reports 
descriptive information on selected firm characteristics existing prior to Regulation FD and changes in analyst behavior pre- 
and post-Regulation FD. Panel C reports descriptive information on the variables used in the capital structure analysis. AdjPIN 
is the adjusted probability of information-based trading from Duarte and Young (2009); Book Leverage is debt to BV of assets; 
Market Leverage is debt to MV of assets; AbRet is abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements; MTB is MV of 
assets divided by BV of assets; R&D is research and development expense divided by total assets, with missing values set to 
industry-year average; Dividend = 1 if the firm distributes common stock dividends in the year, and 0 otherwise; Depreciation is 
depreciation and amortization expense divided by total assets; PPE is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total 
assets; Profit is operating income before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets; Size is the log of net sales; High-
tech Industry = 1 if the firm belongs to high-tech industries, and 0 otherwise; Rev Volatility is the standard deviation of quarterly 
revenue, measured over three years including and preceding the current year; Litigation Cost = 1 if the firm is in a high litigation 
risk industry and also suffers an earnings decrease for at least 4 quarters in the pre-Regulation FD period, and 0 otherwise; 
ROE is operating income before depreciation divided by BV of equity; ROA is operating income before depreciation divided 
by total assets; Sales is net sales measured in millions; Analyst Following is the number of analysts making annual EPS forecasts; 
Forecast Dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analysts' most recent earnings forecast in the 90 days prior to the 
earnings announcement; Forecast Error is the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings per share and the 
median of individual analysts' most recent earnings forecast in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by the 
stock price at the fiscal quarter end. In Panel B the pre-Regulation FD firm characteristics are measured at the means of the 
variables and the change variables are the differences in the means pre- and post-Regulation FD.  
 
Panel A: Average AdjPIN prior to Regulation FD 
 
  Control Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Pre-FD AdjPIN 0.149 0.101 0.128 0.153 0.191 0.287 
 
 
Panel B: Pre-FD firm characteristics and changes in analyst behavior 
 
Variables Q1 Q5 Test of difference (p-value) 
Pre-Regulation FD firm characteristics       
High-tech industry 0.087 0.073 0.267 
Rev volatility 274.472 7.126 <0.001 
Litigation cost 0.148 0.120 0.081 
ROE 0.422 0.257 <0.001 
ROA 0.141 0.095 <0.001 
Sales 7568 172 <0.001 
Changes in analyst behavior       
ΔAnalyst following 1.124 0.188 <0.001 
ΔForecast error 0.001 0.003 0.077 
ΔForecast dispersion 0.006 0.017 0.119 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive information on variables in the capital structure analysis 
 
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev. 
Book Leverage 11786 0.555 0.557 0.210 
Market Leverage 11786 0.437 0.413 0.241 
AbRet 11786 0.048 0.038 0.037 
MTB 11786 1.646 1.274 1.214 
R&D 11786 0.095 0.012 0.321 
Dividend 11786 0.573 1 0.495 
Depreciation 11786 0.041 0.037 0.032 
PPE 11786 0.312 0.254 0.247 
Profit 11786 0.120 0.120 0.117 
Size 11786 6.632 6.726 1.971 
Sales 11786 3826 834 11396 
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Table 3: Changes in Capital Structure 
 
This table presents regression analysis of changes in capital structure associated with Regulation FD. Book Leverage is debt to 
BV of assets; Market Leverage is debt to MV of assets; InfoAsym is the average AdjPIN in the pre-Regulation FD period; Treat = 
1 if the firm is not classified as a public discloser by Wang’s (2007) methodology, and 0 otherwise; FD = 1 if the observation is 
from the post-Regulation FD period, and 0 otherwise; AbRet is abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements; 
MTB is MV of assets divided by BV of assets; R&D is research and development expense divided by total assets, with missing 
values set to industry-year average; Dividend = 1 if the firm distributes common stock dividends in the year, and 0 otherwise; 
Depreciation is depreciation and amortization expense divided by total assets; PPE is net property, plant, and equipment divided 
by total assets; Profit is operating income before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets; Size is the log of net 
sales. t-statistics are in brackets and are calculated based on White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  [1] [2] 
  Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Treat x FD -0.044 -0.036 
  [-1.573] [-1.553] 
Treat x FD x InfoAsym 0.369* 0.330** 
  [1.908] [2.034] 
InfoAsym x FD  -0.479** -0.415*** 
  [-2.566] [-2.686] 
Control variables     
AbRet 0.244*** 0.461*** 
  [5.223] [9.768] 
MTB -0.001 -0.050*** 
  [-0.160] [-7.325] 
R&D -0.022 -0.022 
  [-1.516] [-1.629] 
Dividend -0.026*** -0.043*** 
  [-3.424] [-6.133] 
Depreciation 0.448*** 0.009 
  [2.611] [0.031] 
PPE 0.021 0.058* 
  [0.626] [1.726] 
Profit -0.257*** -0.366*** 
  [-4.912] [-6.305] 
Size 0.027*** 0.034*** 
  [4.385] [5.658] 
      
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 11,786 11,786 
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.841 
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Table 4: Alternative Proxies for Extrinsic Information Asymmetry 
 
This table uses three alternative proxies for extrinsic information asymmetry to test changes in capital structure associated 
Regulation FD. The three alternative proxies are the amount of private information trading constructed based on Llorente et 
al. (2002) and the adverse selection component of the spread estimated based on the methods of Glosten and Harris (1988) 
and Hasbrouck (1991). Book Leverage is debt to BV of assets; Market Leverage is debt to MV of assets; InfoAsym is the average 
extrinsic information asymmetry in the pre-Regulation FD period; Treat = 1 if the firm is not classified as a public discloser by 
Wang’s (2007) methodology, and 0 otherwise; FD = 1 if the observation is from the post-Regulation FD period, and 0 
otherwise; AbRet is abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements; MTB is MV of assets divided by BV of assets; 
R&D is research and development expense divided by total assets, with missing values set to industry-year average; Dividend = 
1 if the firm distributes common stock dividends in the year, and 0 otherwise; Depreciation is depreciation and amortization 
expense divided by total assets; PPE is net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets; Profit is operating income 
before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets; Size is the log of net sales. t-statistics are in brackets and are 
calculated based on White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  
Amount of Private 
Information Trading 
Glosten-Harris Model Hasbrouck Model 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  
Book 
Leverage 
Market  
Leverage 
Book 
Leverage 
Market  
Leverage 
Book  
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
Treat x FD 0.005 0.001 0.0002 -0.003 -0.0001 -0.004 
  [0.782] [0.083] [0.033] [-0.438] [-0.014] [-0.608] 
Treat x FD x InfoAsym 0.166* 0.186*** 0.161 0.168** 0.140 0.189** 
  [1.775] [2.850] [1.550] [1.973] [1.405] [2.183] 
InfoAsym x FD  -0.122 -0.209*** -0.199** -0.210** -0.171* -0.226*** 
  [-1.382] [-3.643] [-1.971] [-2.535] [-1.733] [-2.637] 
Control variables     
    
AbRet 0.165*** 0.281*** 0.176*** 0.304*** 0.158*** 0.283*** 
  [6.904] [9.625] [6.851] [9.467] [6.091] [8.677] 
MTB -0.002** -0.015*** -0.002** -0.015*** -0.002** -0.014*** 
  [-2.406] [-4.730] [-2.256] [-4.647] [-2.076] [-4.613] 
R&D -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  [-0.626] [-0.934] [-0.373] [-0.598] [-0.726] [-0.799] 
Dividend -0.028*** -0.053*** -0.028*** -0.051*** -0.027*** -0.051*** 
  [-5.945] [-10.797] [-5.628] [-9.950] [-5.516] [-9.866] 
Depreciation 0.218*** 0.108 0.228*** 0.109 0.227*** 0.107 
  [2.579] [1.215] [2.704] [1.246] [2.782] [1.305] 
PPE 0.166*** 0.160*** 0.169*** 0.160*** 0.163*** 0.148*** 
  [6.862] [6.823] [6.706] [6.640] [6.222] [5.945] 
Profit -0.197*** -0.225*** -0.196*** -0.222*** -0.192*** -0.210*** 
  [-9.213] [-9.678] [-9.118] [-9.337] [-9.262] [-9.433] 
Size 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 
  [9.247] [9.227] [8.454] [8.905] [7.792] [8.175] 
  
  
    
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 31,073 31,073 29,605 29,605 27,728 27,728 
Adjusted R2 0.812 0.841 0.801 0.833 0.797 0.834 
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Table 5: Open Conference Call Firms as Alternative Control Firms 
 
This table presents results of changes in capital structure using open call firms as an alternative control group. Book Leverage is 
debt to BV of assets; Market Leverage is debt to MV of assets; InfoAsym is the average AdjPIN in the pre-Regulation FD period; 
Treat = 1 if the firm is not classified as a public discloser by Wang’s (2007) methodology, and 0 otherwise; FD = 1 if the 
observation is from the post-Regulation FD period, and 0 otherwise; AbRet is abnormal returns around quarterly earnings 
announcements; MTB is MV of assets divided by BV of assets; R&D is research and development expense divided by total 
assets, with missing values set to industry-year average; Dividend = 1 if the firm distributes common stock dividends in the year, 
and 0 otherwise; Depreciation is depreciation and amortization expense divided by total assets; PPE is net property, plant, and 
equipment divided by total assets; Profit is operating income before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets; Size 
is the log of net sales. t-statistics are in brackets and are calculated based on White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors 
clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  [1] [2] 
  Book Leverage Market Leverage 
Treat x FD -0.032 -0.064* 
  [-0.863] [-1.710] 
Treat x FD x InfoAsym 0.327 0.426* 
  [1.518] [1.726] 
InfoAsym x FD  -0.464** -0.519** 
  [-2.205] [-2.141] 
Control variables     
AbRet 0.241*** 0.487*** 
  [5.163] [10.166] 
MTB -0.001 -0.050*** 
  [-0.173] [-7.304] 
R&D -0.021 -0.020 
  [-1.490] [-1.506] 
Dividend -0.027*** -0.044*** 
  [-3.463] [-6.234] 
Depreciation 0.458*** 0.019 
  [2.666] [0.066] 
PPE 0.022 0.060* 
  [0.635] [1.772] 
Profit -0.257*** -0.370*** 
  [-4.844] [-6.219] 
Size 0.028*** 0.035*** 
  [4.498] [5.736] 
      
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 11,786 11,786 
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.842 
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Table 6: Changes in Cost of Debt 
 
This table examines changes in cost of debt around Regulation FD. For bank loans, Spread is the number of basis points above 
LIBOR charged on the loan and for public bonds, it is the number of basis points above the yield of Treasury bond with 
similar maturity and coupon rate; InfoAsym is the average AdjPIN in the pre-Regulation FD period; Treat = 1 if the firm is not 
classified as a public discloser by Wang’s (2007) methodology, and 0 otherwise; FD = 1 if the observation is from the post-
Regulation FD period, and 0 otherwise; S&PRating is the predicted S&P rating following the procedure in Barth et al. (2008) 
and ranges from 1 for AAA to 22 for D; MktLev is debt to MV of assets; Size is the log of net sales; Maturity is the number of 
years between the start and the end date of the debt; DebtSize is the amount of the debt raised divided by the total assets of the 
borrower; CreditSpread is the difference between the Baa corporate bond and 30-year yield on the U.S. Treasury bonds; 
YieldSpread is the difference in the 10-year and 3-month yield on the U.S. Treasury bonds; Security = 1 if the borrowing is 
secured, and 0 otherwise; Redeem = 1 if the issuer can redeem the bond before maturity, and 0 otherwise; Age is the number of 
days the firm appears on CRSP when the bond is issued; Revolve =1 if the loan is a revolving loan, and 0 otherwise; Takeover =1 
if the purpose of the loan is for takeover, and 0 otherwise. S&PRating, MktLev, and Size are measured at the fiscal year end 
preceding the debt contract. CreditSpread and YieldSpread are measured at the month when the debt is issued. t-statistics are in 
brackets and are calculated based on White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
  [1] [2] [3] 
  Public & Private Public Debt Private Debt 
Treat x FD 10.765 10.248 21.550 
  [0.461] [0.226] [1.045] 
Treat x FD x InfoAsym -33.972 -62.490 -43.162 
  [-0.194] [-0.160] [-0.272] 
InfoAsym x FD  105.576 188.487 132.458 
  [0.690] [0.584] [0.930] 
Control variables       
S&PRating 4.865*** 6.049** 4.336** 
  [2.843] [2.339] [2.286] 
MktLev 217.199*** 297.159*** 202.178*** 
  [10.469] [7.186] [8.723] 
Size -24.326*** -31.248*** -20.642*** 
  [-3.174] [-2.823] [-2.624] 
Maturity 2.118*** 0.803*** 3.394** 
  [7.464] [2.872] [2.088] 
DebtSize -16.336* 42.673 -9.707 
  [-1.868] [1.048] [-1.087] 
CreditSpread 78.298*** 113.591*** 52.583*** 
  [9.114] [7.436] [4.584] 
YieldSpread 0.571 0.321 5.116** 
  [0.236] [0.089] [1.988] 
Security 21.891*** 133.067* 44.673*** 
  [2.915] [1.837] [6.222] 
Redeem   25.299***   
    [2.825]   
Age   2.223   
    [0.386]   
Revolve     -23.611*** 
      [-5.649] 
Takeover     18.438*** 
      [3.285] 
        
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 6,054 2,299 3,755 
Adjusted R2 0.654 0.763 0.702 
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Table 7: Changes in Capital Structure – 2SLS approach 
 
This table uses a 2SLS model to examine changes in capital structure associated with Regulation FD. Book Leverage is debt to 
BV of assets; Market Leverage is debt to MV of assets; FD = 1 if the observation is from the post-Regulation FD period, and 0 
otherwise; Predicted AdjPIN is the fitted value of AdjPIN from the first stage; AbRet is abnormal returns around quarterly 
earnings announcements; MTB is MV of assets divided by BV of assets; R&D is research and development expense divided 
by total assets, with missing values set to industry-year average; Dividend = 1 if the firm distributes common stock dividends in 
the year, and 0 otherwise; Depreciation is depreciation and amortization expense divided by total assets; PPE is net property, 
plant, and equipment divided by total assets; Profit is operating income before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total 
assets; Size is the log of net sales; InstOwn is the proportion of the firm’s shares held by institutions; Coverage is the number of 
analysts making annual EPS forecasts; Volume is the average monthly share turnover; Volatility is the standard deviation of the 
daily stock return. t-statistics are in brackets and are calculated based on White heteroscedastic consistent standard errors 
clustered by firm. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
  AdjPIN 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
AdjPIN 
Book 
Leverage 
Market 
Leverage 
FD -0.009***     -0.006***     
  [-5.441]     [-3.769]     
Predicted AdjPIN   1.173** 0.837*   1.315* 1.562** 
    [2.499] [1.816]   [1.913] [2.149] 
Control variables             
AbRet 0.009 0.261*** 0.389*** -0.0002 0.058 0.096 
  [0.457] [5.247] [7.300] [-0.009] [1.111] [1.505] 
MTB -0.003*** 0.003 -0.019*** -0.002* 0.003 -0.021*** 
  [-2.651] [0.956] [-3.897] [-1.905] [0.665] [-4.488] 
R&D 0.001 -0.014 -0.018* 0.008 -0.037** -0.055** 
  [0.107] [-1.323] [-1.724] [1.109] [-1.990] [-2.535] 
Dividend -0.010*** -0.016* -0.023** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.004 
  [-3.114] [-1.922] [-2.480] [-3.097] [-0.489] [-0.369] 
Depreciation 0.174*** 0.405** 0.342* 0.099** 0.321** 0.212 
  [3.137] [2.553] [1.805] [2.159] [2.275] [1.485] 
PPE 0.019 -0.008 0.004 0.015 -0.015 0.004 
  [1.427] [-0.232] [0.109] [1.294] [-0.425] [0.091] 
Profit -0.008 -0.350*** -0.412*** -0.009 -0.396*** -0.440*** 
  [-0.536] [-9.537] [-10.239] [-0.584] [-9.758] [-9.459] 
Size -0.025*** 0.062*** 0.054*** -0.018*** 0.074*** 0.079*** 
  [-11.306] [4.007] [3.544] [-9.098] [4.566] [4.587] 
InstOwn       -0.014 -0.033** -0.036** 
        [-1.217] [-2.027] [-2.370] 
Coverage       -0.002*** -0.003 -0.002 
        [-9.919] [-1.598] [-1.117] 
Volume       -0.071*** 0.082 0.079 
        [-4.005] [1.336] [1.226] 
Volatility       0.243*** 1.299*** 1.495*** 
        [2.967] [5.142] [5.056] 
              
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 11,667 11,667 11,667 11,527 11,527 11,527 
Adjusted R2 0.634 - - 0.665 - - 
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Table 8: Estimation of Private Disclosers, Public Disclosers, and Non-disclosers 
 
This table presents the classification results of pre-Regulation FD private disclosers, pre-Regulation FD public disclosers, and 
pre-Regulation FD non-disclosers. The methodology follows Wang (2007). Panel A reports the estimation results of quarterly 
private earnings guidance. Panel B reports descriptive statistics on earnings related public disclosers by discloser type. UF is 
unexpected analyst forecast estimated following Matsumoto (2002); StdΔEPS is seasonal changes in EPS during the prior three 
years; LOSS =1 if the firm reports a loss in the quarter, and 0 otherwise; PublicDisclosure is the number of earnings related 
public disclosure in the quarter. t-statistics are in brackets and are calculated based on White heteroscedastic consistent 
standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Panel A: Estimation of pre-Regulation FD quarterly private earnings guidance 
 
  |UF| 
StdΔEPS 0.168 
  [17.72]*** 
LOSS 0.054 
  [5.08]*** 
#PublicDisclosure 0.009 
  [2.02]** 
    
Observations 41210 
Adjusted R2 0.27 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on the number of public disclosures 
 
Firm type Observations Mean Std Dev. Median 
Non-discloser 2915 0.027 0.172 0 
Private discloser 973 0.217 0.596 0 
Public discloser 993 0.585 0.876 0 
 
  
 
